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Abstract
Set-theoretic and category-theoretic foundations represent different perspec-
tives on mathematical subject matter. In particular, category-theoretic language
focusses on properties that can be determined up to isomorphism within a cate-
gory, whereas set theory admits of properties determined by the internal struc-
ture of the membership relation. Various objections have been raised against this
aspect of set theory in the category-theoretic literature. In this article, we advocate
a methodological pluralism concerning the two foundational languages, and pro-
vide a theory that fruitfully interrelates a ‘structural’ perspective to a set-theoretic
one. We present a set-theoretic system that is able to talk about structures more
naturally, and argue that it provides an important perspective on plausibly struc-
tural properties such as cardinality. We conclude the language of set theory can
provide useful information about the notion of mathematical structure.
Introduction
Two approaches (and, as the current volume shows, maybe more) in current de-
bates on foundations provide radically different perspectives on mathematical sub-
ject matter. The set-theoretic1 perspective holds that all mathematical objects may be
modelled in the sets, a formalism given in terms of a primitive membership-relation,
and that this (in some sense) provides a useful foundation. The category-theoretic per-
spective, on the other hand, holds that all mathematical objects may be modelled by
the kinds of mapping properties they have with respect to others. As we shall see
below, the two provide somewhat different perspectives on mathematics. In light of
this datum, a question which has sprung up in the literature is which foundation we
should use for interpreting mathematics (assuming that a foundation is desirable at
all).
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1This term is slightly coarse since it is ambiguous between material and categorial set theories (we will
distinguish these later). For those that know the difference between the two types of set theory, we mean
“material set theory” by “set theory” until we make the distinction, and lump categorial set theories in
with category-theoretic foundations for now.
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One particular application to which category theory has been seen as especially
suited to is elucidating the notion of mathematical structure.2 A definition of mathe-
matical structure is somewhat difficult to provide, but for the purposes of this paper
we will take it that the existence of an isomorphism is sufficient for sameness of
mathematical structure, and that this provides a useful way of getting at the notion
(even if only partially).
This paper is directed at the following question:
Main Question. To what extent is (material) set theory a useful tool for
discovering interesting facts about structures?
We will argue that set-theoretic language can be useful for conveying important
structural information. In particular, we provide a theory of sets and classes which
better respects isomorphism invariance, but nonetheless makes extensive use of the
ambient material set theory. This is especially important if one holds that cardinality
is a structural property; the theory we provide allows us to see how theories and
cardinality interact (via a version of the Morley Categoricity Theorem).
Our strategy is as follows. First (§1) we briefly outline the set-theoretic and cat-
egorial approaches, and explain the tasks to which each is best suited. Next (§2) we
examine the difficulties that some proponents of each foundation have seen for the
other party, and provide some responses on behalf of each. We argue that they are
not in themselves problematic, but raise a challenge for the advocate of set-theoretic
foundations. We then (§3) present a theory of sets, urelements, and the classes that
can be built over them. We argue that this language provides a modification of (ma-
terial) set theory that better respects structural properties, whilst providing us with
the resources to easily talk about notions like cardinality and how it interacts with
structural notions. Finally (§4) we make some concluding remarks and present some
open questions.
1 Two perspectives on foundations: Set-theoretic and
Categorial
In this section we’ll explain the basic difference we see between category-theoretic
and (material) set-theoretic foundations. We’ll then refine both our set-theoretic and
category-theoretic perspectives to give a better account of the subject matter they
concern.
The distinction between the set-theoretic and category-theoretic perspective may
be cast in different ways, however the most basic contrast is in how they approach
the representation of garden-variety mathematical entities. The question is one of a
perspective on which mathematics is about objects (and the internal membership-
structure those objects exhibit), versus one on which mathematics is about particular
kinds of roles a mathematical object can perform within a wider context. Under set-
theoretic foundations, we focus on translating the language of a particular mathe-
matical theoryT into the language of set theoryL∈ (consisting of only the language
of first-order logic and a single non-logical symbol ∈), and then find a model for
T in the sets (given, of course, some antecedently accepted set theory). From the
category-theoretic perspective, we would rather see what the essential relationships
T-objects have to one another, and then try and capture these relationships through
2See, for example, [Awodey, 1996].
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the notions of arrow and composition. To see this difference, a couple of examples are
pertinent:
Example 1. Singletons. In set theory the singleton of an object x is the one-
element set {x}. Different singletons can look very different from the set-theoretic
perspective; for example {∅} and {iω} are both singletons, but have very dif-
ferent properties (for example, their transitive closures look very different).
Conversely in category theory, we have the notion of a terminal object 1,
where an object 1 is terminal in a category C iff there is one and only one arrow
from any other C-object to 1. Terminal objects can have a variety of different
properties in different situations. For example, if we think of a partial order
P = (P,≤P) as a kind of category (so there is an arrow from p0 to p1 just in
case p0 ≤P p1), then if P has a maximal element it will be terminal. Interest-
ingly, in the set-theoretic context, we can form a category Set consisting of all
sets as objects and the functions between them as arrows. We then see that
between any set A and any singleton {x} there is exactly one function given
by the rule f(a) = x for every a ∈ A, and so the terminal objects of Set are
exactly the singletons. Nonetheless, from the category-theoretic perspective it
doesn’t really matter which terminal object we talk about, since all terminal ob-
jects are isomorphic within any particular category. This contrasts sharply with
the set-theoretic case where different singletons can have different interesting
set-theoretic properties (such as identity of transitive closure).
Example 2. Products. In set theory, we define the product A × B of two sets
A and B by first picking a canonical choice of ordered pair, and then letting
A×B = {〈a, b〉|a ∈ A ∧ b ∈ B} (giving us the ‘rectangle’ of A and B). Products
of more complicated objects are then defined component-wise. For example,
the direct product of two groups G = (DG, ∗G) and H = (DH , ∗H) is defined as
the following group:
G×Group H = (DG ×DH , ∗G×H)
Where ∗G×H is defined component-wise for g ∈ G and h ∈ H :
〈g1, h1〉 ∗G×H 〈g2, h2〉 =df 〈g1 ∗G g2, h1 ∗H h2〉
Conversely, in category theory, a product of two C-objects A and B is an-
other C-object A × B together with two C-arrows PrA : A × B → A and
PrB : A × B → B, such that for any pair of arrows f : C → A and g : C → B,
there is exactly one arrow 〈f, g〉 : C → A × B making the following diagram
commute:
C
A A×B B
f g〈f,g〉
PrA PrB
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From the category-theoretic perspective, any objects that fulfil this role are
a product (and, indeed, products are unique up to C-isomorphism). In the case
of sets and groups, the definition of set-theoretic product will (in Set) fulfil this
role (using the relevant projections as PrA and PrB), as will the definition of
direct product for groups (when we consider the category Grp consisting of all
groups as objects and group homomorphisms as arrows). However, any other
definition of product resulting from a different definition of ordered pair would
equally well qualify as a category-theoretic product (and indeed, we could find
a function between the sets involved in the two products, ‘factoring’ one prod-
uct through the other).
The difference in the above cases is the following: In set-theoretic foundations,
representations of mathematical objects are obtained by construction from the mem-
bership relation and a suitable coding. On the category-theoretic perspective, we
simply state what arrow-theoretic properties an entity must have in order to fulfil
the functions it does in normal mathematical reasoning.
The eagle-eyed and/or well-informed reader may regard the distinction between
set-theoretic and category-theoretic as a false dichotomy, since one can give categorial
theories of sets by axiomatising the external functional properties attaching to the
objects in a (or maybe ‘the’) universe of sets. This is precisely what is done on many
categorial3 set theories such as on Lawvere’s4 Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets
(ETCS), which we’ll examine in a little more detail later. In this way, it seems like
the term ‘set theory’ can be correctly applied to certain categorial theories. For this
reason we make the following distinction:
Definition 3. (Informal.) Material set theories are those that axiomatise a primitive
notion of membership (denoted by ‘∈’), from which mathematical objects may be
coded. Categorial set theory on the other hand provides a theory of sets formulated
in the language of category theory, and on which objects are coded by systems of
arrows resembling the usual properties we expect set-theoretic functions to have.
Membership in categorial set theory is a defined relation, often5 explained in terms
of functions x : 1→ A (read: “x is a member of A”), since one can think of any such
function (from a ‘singleton’) as ‘picking’ a member of A.6
To make our initial question more precise, we are interested in the extent to which
material set theory tell us interesting information about structures. Where the term
“set theory” occurs without a qualifier, we mean material set theory and take catego-
rial set theory to be a part of categorial foundations.
Both set theory and category theory allow us to identify objects up to structural
equivalence. Exactly how they do so is a tricky issue, and provides us with a third:
Example 4. Isomorphisms. In set theory, working within first-order logic, we set-
tle upon some relevant coding of vocabulary (i.e. function, constant, and relation
3There is some dispute over the use of the term ‘categorial’ versus ‘structural’ when axiomatising sets
in category theory. We use the term ‘categorial’ since we reserve structure-like terms for the philosophical
notion of structure.
4See [Lawvere, 1965] for the original presentation, and [Lawvere and McLarty, 2005] for an up-
dated version. A clean and concise presentation (with some informal commentary) is available in
[Leinster, 2014].
5As with many notions in category theory, there are different arrow-theoretic ways of getting at the
same idea. See, for example, [Goldblatt, 1984] (Ch. 4) for some discussion.
6We are grateful to Michael Shulman and Dimitris Tsementzis for emphasising the importance of mak-
ing this distinction.
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symbols), of structure (usually as an ordered tuple), and satisfaction on a structure
of formulas in this language (given by an interpretation function on a structure).
We then say that two structures in the same vocabularyA andB are isomorphic iff
there is a (coded) bijection between their domains such that for every relation
symbol R of the vocabulary (respectively for function and constant symbols)
and for every finite sequence ~a from A, RA(~a) iff RB(f(~a)).
Importantly (an issue often glossed over in mathematics)a discussion of iso-
morphism only makes sense once the vocabulary (and some suitable coding
thereof) has been chosen (on top of the coding-dependence of the set-theoretic
analysis of bijection).
In category theory, however, the notion of isomorphism is dealt with by ex-
ternal arrow-theoretic properties. An arrow f : X → Y is an isomorphism (in
a category C) iff there is a C-arrow g : Y → X in such that g ◦ f = IdX and
f ◦ g = IdY (i.e. composing the functions in either direction yields the identity
morphism). Two objects are said to be isomorphic (in C) iff there is an isomor-
phism between them. Importantly, the notion of isomorphism only makes sense
within a category.
The treatment of isomorphism through a particular kind of arrow results
in contexts in which the notion of set-theoretic and category-theoretic isomor-
phism come apart. For example, there are cases where we have category-theoretic
isomorphisms that are not bijective homomorphisms (in the material set-theoretic
sense). One such kind is when the relevant arrows are simply not functions,
such as in the category of proofs which has sentences as objects and equiva-
lence classes of proofs as arrows (so there is a single arrow f : P → QwhenQ is
derivable from P ). Here, since isomorphisms are equivalence classes of proofs
between equivalent sentences, we have isomorphisms that are not (properly
speaking) bijections of any kind. In the context where there is a functorial rela-
tionship between the category and Set, however, there can be no non-bijective
isomorphisms (since functors preserve isomorphisms).
However, in the case where there is no functor between the category and Set,
this is possible. An interesting (yet complex) case is the homotopy category that
has topological spaces as objects and homotopy classes of continuous functions
as arrows. Here, the inclusion of the unit circle into the punctured plane is an
isomorphism (its inverse is the radial projection map), which is not bijective. In
fact, [Freyd, 1970] showed that this is not a concrete category (i.e. there is no nice
faithful functor from this category to Set), which facilitates the consideration of
non-bijective iso-arrows.b,c
aSee [Baldwin, 2018] (Ch. 1, esp. §1.2) for an argument that this is an often ignored distinction.
bI am grateful to Andrew Brooke-Taylor for bringing this example to my attention, and discus-
sion of the issue.
cA further simple (but somewhat silly) example is the following category which we define
material-set-theoretically. The category has just one object {a, b}, and a single morphism defined
by f(a) = f(b) = b. Here f = Id{a,b} (in the category), and so is trivially iso, but is nonetheless
non-bijective.
The above example is important, since it shows that even the notion of structural
similarity (as captured by the notion of isomorphism) is differently interpreted by
the two perspectives. Thus, whether or not a property is ‘isomorphism’ invariant
depends already on whether one holds one of the two perspectives to be privileged.
It should also be noted that talk of ‘objects’ is dispensable from the category-
theoretic perspective. Really, by taking the notion of domain and co-domain as
part-and-parcel of the arrow, we could just speak purely in terms of arrows and
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composition. Material set theory and category theory thus represent two different
perspectives on the nature of mathematical subject matter; on the one hand, we
might think of mathematical objects as constructed and determined by their inter-
nal membership-structure, and on the other we might think of them as determined
(up to isomorphism) by their relationships to other entities, and the role they play in
the category as a whole.
This underlying difference in perspective represents two sides of a long-standing7
philosophical divide: Should we think of the subject matter of mathematics as given
by individual objects with particular intrinsic relations determining their properties,
or should we rather think of the subject matter of mathematics as concerned with
purely structural properties (i.e. those invariant up to isomorphism)? The material
set-theoretic and categorial perspectives are interesting representatives of different
sides of this divide (though, as we shall see, issues are more subtle than they first
appear).8
2 Objections: Refining the perspectives
As it stands, however, there are puzzles for each conception of foundations. In this
section, we explain some of the complaints that have been made about the different
foundational viewpoints and argue that these are easily resolvable. We’ll argue that
this suggests a possible route of inquiry for the friend of set-theoretic foundations; to
modify their language in order to better respect isomorphism invariance and struc-
ture.
2.1 Objections to categorial foundations and schematic types
One supposed ‘problem’ for the friend of category-theoretic foundations concerns
its subject matter. What, exactly, is category theory about? For, as it stands, category
theory merely defines particular kinds of algebraic structure. The discipline seems to
be of a piece with algebraic enterprises such as group theory or other areas of ab-
stract algebra. One begins by laying down conditions on what a system of arrows
must satisfy in order to be a category (existence of identity and composition mor-
phisms, and associativity of composition). This defines an algebraic structure much
like that of group (in fact, there is a corresponding abstract algebraic structure for
category that is slightly more general than that of group; namely then notion of being
a monoid), which can then be made more specific with additional constraints. For
example, insisting that particular diagrams exist and commute in a category yields
the definition of a topos: a Cartesian closed category with a subobject classifier. This
kind of category is very useful for studying the algebraic properties instantiated by
various logical and mathematical systems, and while it is exceptionally rich in struc-
ture, it still (in the spirit of category theory) just corresponds to particular algebraic
properties that a system of arrows can instantiate. Hellman sums up this thought:
“...this theory [i.e. category theory] itself is presented algebraically, via
first-order ‘axioms’ only in the sense of defining conditions telling us what
a category is, together with further ones defining topoi of various sorts.
7At least since [Benacerraf, 1965].
8A salient third option (especially given the topic of the current volume) is Homotopy Type
Theory. Here type theory endowed with a homotopy-theoretic interpretation is employed, pro-
viding a foundation that meshes elegantly with category-theoretic methods. See the excellent
[The Univalent Foundations Program, 2013] for discussion.
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As such these ‘axioms’ are like the conditions defining a group, a ring, a
module, a field, etc. By themselves they assert nothing. They merely tell us
what it is for something to be a structure of a certain kind.” ([Hellman, 2006],
p. 134)
Hellman’s point (an important one) is that the axioms of category theory (even
when expanded to isolate categories of more complex varieties) make no existential
claims (this is what Hellman means by saying that the axioms “assert nothing”) in
that they specify what it is for a system of objects to satisfy certain axioms, without
asserting that anything satisfying them actually exists.
Some (including [Hellman, 2006]) have taken this as an objection to category-
theoretic foundations. An appropriate foundation for mathematics should state that
some objects exist and that mathematics can be interpreted within this structure,
thereby laying a framework ontology on which mathematics can be built. Thus cat-
egory theory appears to contrast with the usual set-theoretic foundations, where the
axioms of Infinity, Power Set, and Replacement all make existential claims within
ZFC, and many other axioms extending ZFC also make existential claims.9
This objection should not trouble the friend of category-theoretic foundations.
One salient response (made by [Mclarty, 2004]) is that no-one has ever proposed the
axioms of category theory as a foundation, the proposal is rather to assert that some
topos or other exists and mathematics either can or should be interpreted there.
Good examples here are categorial theories of sets (such as ETCS) or attempts to
axiomatise a category of all categories (e.g. CCAF).
Moreover, we might also think that Hellman’s objection simply misses the mark.
His remarks reveal something about the general practice of category theory: It is an
algebraic discipline, no matter whether it can be modified to yield assertory content,
as McLarty suggests. When practising category theory, we care only about whether
we have the relevant relations between objects, and this does contrast with set theory
where (largely speaking) we are interested in the properties of some specific struc-
ture (namely the cumulative hierarchy).10 This feature of the two frameworks is fur-
ther witnessed by attitudes to categoricity. In a categoricity proof, we aim to show
that a certain theory has just one model (up to isomorphism). In the context of set
theory (or indeed number theory and analysis) the project of providing a categoric-
ity proof makes sense; we wish to see that our axiomatisation has been successful
and we have (given the determinacy of the concept) pinned down a single structure
up to isomorphism.11 In the case of number theory and analysis we have proofs of
full categoricity (by the work of Dedekind), and in the case of set theory we have
quasi-categoricity: We can show that ZFC2 augmented with anti-large cardinal ax-
ioms can be fully categorical, and any two ZFC2 structures are either isomorphic or
one is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other.12 In the case of category theory
though, to attempt such a proof for a categorial theory would be an absurd endeav-
our, the whole point of category theory is to isolate structural properties that can be
9Good examples here are so called large cardinal axioms, as well as forcing axioms, and inner model hy-
potheses.
10Here we are playing slightly fast-and-loose with debates in the foundations of set theory; under a
natural interpretation of Joel Hamkins’ multiverse perspective, set theory also should be understood as
purely algebraic. See [Hamkins, 2012] for the original presentation of this view and [Barton, 2016] for an
argument to the effect that this results in a purely algebraic interpretation.
11The exact dialectic import of a categoricity proof is something of a vexed question, see
[Meadows, 2013] for discussion. An argument that the quasi-categoricity of ZFC2 shows that our ax-
iomatisation has been successful is available in [Isaacson, 2011].
12The original proof of this is available in [Zermelo, 1930], and is subsequently tidied up in
[Shepherdson, 1951] and [Shepherdson, 1952].
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shared by radically non-isomorphic structures.
Thus categories demand no single place to be interpreted, and the complaint that
category theory fails to delimit a determinate range of objects is misplaced. The
friend of set-theoretic foundations, for example, will regard it as of a piece with
group theory; if category-theory has any subject matter at all, it is the category-
theoretic structure that can be instantiated in various ways in the sets (and so she
should countenance category theory as a useful foundational language, even if it
is not her favourite foundation). There is no pressure to find ‘the’ structure of ‘the’
category-theoretic world; the discipline is designed to be flexible and resist such a
characterisation.
A friend of category-theoretic foundations might thus regard the subject matter
of mathematics as fundamentally algebraic, category theory as providing a good
axiomatisation of this perspective, but nonetheless resisting the characterisation of a
unique concrete subject matter. If category theory has a subject matter at all, then it
is a purely structural one.
An immediate and difficult question is how we should think of this category-
theoretic structural subject matter. Landry and Marquis provide the following inter-
esting idea:
“A category, too, is neither a privileged abstract kind of system nor is it
an abstract Fregean “structure” qua an “object”: it is a Hilbertian style
abstract structure qua a schematic type, to be used as a framework for
expressing what we can say about the shared structure of the various
abstract kinds of structured systems in terms of ‘having’ the same type of
structure.” ([Landry and Marquis, 2005], p. 35)
The thought here is to think of categories as providing structure as a ‘schematic
type’, rather than a ‘particular structure’. Of course, it bears explaining what a
‘schematic type’ is. One kind of schematic type is well known to mathematical
logicians—the notion of first-order theory. These, if they can be instantiated in any
infinite context, can be instantiated in many infinite contexts. We leave it open
whether non-first-orderisable content can be expressed categorially. If higher-order
content (with a version of the full semantics) can be encoded in a categorial language,
then it is at least possible that we might determine a structure up to (set-theoretic) iso-
morphism categorially. Whether or not this is possible we leave open; for now, we
note that the ability to systematise relationships across non-isomorphic contexts just
is one of the main strengths of category theory, and many proponents of categorial
foundations do see category theory in this light (e.g. [Mac Lane, 1986]).
Thus we take the target of category theory to be showing the basic relationships
objects have to have to one another to fulfil their functional roles. In order to un-
derstand better the notion of schematic type, it is useful to return to the analogy with
group theory. While it makes sense to speak of ‘the group-theoretic structure’, there
is not a single way the group-theoretic structure can be instantiated, rather it admits of
satisfaction in multiple different ways and contexts (and indeed this is one of the rea-
sons why abstract algebra has been so fruitful in contemporary mathematics). This is
much the same for categories, which provide a useful framework for systematising
these relationships. We thus provide the following:
Definition 5. (Informal and philosophical) A schematic type is a system of relation-
ships that can be instantiated in many different non-isomorphic contexts.
Viewing category theory as the appropriate theory for formalising schematic
types, we see that the problem of ‘subject matter’ is not really a problem at all.
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Rather, category-theoretic foundations provide a language and context in which to
study algebraic relationships, and for this reason precisely resist the identification of
a concrete subject matter. Categories correspond to theories of mappings and can be
multiply instantiated throughout concrete systems of objects, and there is no pres-
sure to identify a unique subject matter or make it assertory in nature.13
2.2 Objections to set theory and the combinatorial perspective
In this subsection, we’ll delve into some of the criticisms of material set theory. We’ll
show that when set theory is understood as applying to an appropriate subject mat-
ter (namely providing an analysis of possible combinations of objects) the objections
fail to gain traction. We’ll therefore suggest that a methodological pluralism is an at-
tractive attitude to foundations. Before moving onto the final section, we’ll identify
that a possible line of inquiry for the friend of set-theoretic foundations is to provide
a modification of her language that better respects isomorphism invariance.
The objections to set-theoretic foundations come in two broad kinds, as Feferman
(speaking about [Mac Lane, 1971]) explains:
“Two views are intermixed in [Mac Lane, 1971] as to current set-theoretical
foundations, namely that (i) they are inappropriate for mathematics as
practised, and (ii) they are inadequate for the full needs of category the-
ory.” ([Feferman, 1977], p. 149)
Our strategy will be the following. We expand on Feferman’s two dimensions,
articulating the different objections we find in the literature. For reasons that will
become apparent (we find the former dimension to be the more challenging of the
two), we deal with these in reverse order, starting with inadequacy. As we go, we
will provide responses from the set-theoretic standpoint. We do, however, have to
be careful about dialectical strategy. In ‘defending the set-theoretic viewpoint’ we
could be doing one of (at least) two things:
1. We could be arguing that, despite the category-theoreticians best efforts, set
theory is still the best foundation for discussing mathematical structure.
2. Slightly weaker, we could contend that despite arguments to the contrary, set
theory is still interesting as a foundation as it has plenty to tell us about mathe-
matical structure.
We wish to emphasise that it is this latter claim we wish to support. We wish
to claim that despite many criticisms in the literature, set theory can still provide
interesting information about how certain structural properties are instantiated.
2.2.1 Inadequacy
The problem of inadequacy is roughly the following: Set theory does not provide
enough of something (either objects or information). The key issue is raised by Mac
Lane:
13A second objection, one that we will not consider here, is the point raised by [Mathias, 2000] and
[Mathias, 2001] that category theory lacks the logical strength to discuss certain strong statements of anal-
ysis that relate to large cardinal axioms. While the objection merits a response, we set this aside for several
reasons: (1) research is ongoing here, and it is unclear that category theory cannot do the job, (2) there are,
in any case, logically strong category-theoretic statements (see below), and (3) the possible responses to
the objection do not help us elucidate the philosophical role being played by category theory in terms of
schematic types.
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“Our fundamental observation is just this: There is an appreciable body
of results about categories...but the received methods of defining cate-
gories in terms of sets do not provide any one single context (i.e. any one
model of a standard set theory) within which one can comprehensively
state these results.” ([Mac Lane, 1971], p. 235)
The fundamental idea is the following: It is undeniable that the methods of cate-
gory theory have provided a versatile method for modern mathematics. This raises
the question for the friend of set-theoretic foundations: “Given that category theory
provides structural information, what sets should we interpret category theory as
about?”.
Mac Lane’s point is that there is no single context in which we can interpret cate-
gory theory unrestrictedly. This is visible in two related but distinct dimensions: (i)
Which model14 we should take to found category theory, and (ii) Which categories we
should expect set theory to found.15
What model? The first issue concerns exactly what the relevant model should sat-
isfy. Simply put, the widespread independence phenomenon in set theory has chal-
lenged the classical idea that there is a single maximal universe of sets in which we
may interpret all mathematical discourse. This is discussed by Mac Lane:
“These results, and others too numerous to mention, show that many
interesting Mathematical questions cannot be settled on the basis of the
Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms for set theory. Various additional axioms have
been proposed, including axioms which insure the existence of some very
large cardinal numbers and an axiom of determinacy (for certain games)
which in its full form contradicts the axiom of choice. This variety and
the undecideability results indicate that set theory is indeterminate in
principle: There is no unique and definitive list of axioms for sets; the in-
tuitive idea of a set as a collection can lead to wildly different and mutu-
ally inconsistent formulations. On the elementary level, there are options
such as ZFC, ZC, ZBQC or intuitionistic set theory; on the higher level,
the method of forcing provides many alternative models with divergent
properties. The platonic notion that there is somewhere the ideal realm
of sets, not yet fully described, is a glorious illusion.” ([Mac Lane, 1986],
p. 385)16
Since our expertise is primarily in higher-set theory (i.e. ZFC and its extensions)
and independence, we approach the issue from that perspective. As is well-known,
there are many set-theoretic sentences independent of our canonical set theory ZFC
(e.g. CH). Mac Lane takes this to show that there is no one notion of ‘set’ and hence
no one place that category theory can be interpreted. We have two responses to this
argument:
Response 1. This explicitly takes a stand on the status of certain questions in the
philosophy of set theory. In particular, it turns on how many universes of set there
are (or at least how many distinct but legitimate concepts of set there are). While the
14We use the term ‘model’ in a loose and informal way here, and intend it to apply to possibly proper-
class-sized structures. For example, we will at least allow (L,∈) as a model, even though it is proper-class-
sized.
15In the quotation above, Mac Lane is specifically interested in the first point we consider. However,
the intuition expressed transfers naturally to other objections he makes, as outlined below.
16Similar remarks are made repeatedly in [Mac Lane, 1986], cf. pp. 359–360, 373.
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independence phenomenon is certainly challenging, this does not mean that there
are multiple ‘meanings’ to the word “set”. Thus, for the theorist who simply re-
jects the claim that the independence phenomenon indicates semantic or ontological
indeterminacy, the objection gains no traction (without further argument).
Response 2. Even if we allow the existence of different universes or concepts of
set, Mac Lane’s criticism is subject to a tu quoque. This is because, as we explained
above, category theory by its nature does not demand a single context for interpreta-
tion (in fact quite the reverse). Rather, we argued, category theory should be under-
stood as providing a uniform language in which to study algebraic properties and
schematic types. Thus to insist on a single model or axiomatisation in which cate-
gory theory should be interpreted is to impute content to it that is simply not there.
Thus, insofar as this is a problem for set theory at all, it is also one for categorial
foundations.
This allows a quick response to Mac Lane’s objection: Even if there are multiple
set-theoretic concepts or universes, and no overarching context, this does not mat-
ter. Wherever we study category-theoretic properties set-theoretically (discussion of
particular set-theoretic interpretations is provided below), we know that our results
will transfer to the alternative cases via the schematic properties of category theory.
It is enough for us to study category-theoretic structure set-theoretically to find one
set-theoretic structure exemplifying the relevant schematic type. For the purposes
of set-theoretic foundations, we do not need to find the set-theoretic subject matter
corresponding to category theory.17
Which categories? The second problem of inadequacy concerns what one has within
a particular context. Simply put, category theory seems to speak about structures
that are proper-class-sized, and so do not have any set-theoretic representative. An
obvious example here is Set, the category of all sets that has as arrows set-theoretic
functions (this can be given direct category-theoretic axiomatisation by ETCS or its
extensions).18 There are, however, many such categories (e.g Grp, Top, Fld, etc.).
There are two main strategies for overcoming this problem. The first is to posit
the existence of Grothendieck universes and interpret category theory there. More for-
mally:
Definition 6. A Grothendieck universe is a set U with the following properties:
(i) U contains the set of all natural numbers.
(ii) U is transitive.
(iii) U is closed under the formation of pair sets.
(iv) U is closed under the formation of power sets.
(v) U is closed under set-theoretic union.
(vi) If x ∈ U , f : x→ y is a surjection, and y ⊆ U , then y ∈ U .
We can then interpret category theory as concerned with any such universe. For
instance, Set can be interpreted as concerned with the sets in some U (let’s call this
17A similar point is made in [Maddy, 2017]. For some other remarks on what we would like from set-
theoretic foundations, see also Maddy’s contribution to the present volume [Maddy, F].
18The topos axiomatised by ETCS is that of a well-pointed topos with a natural number object and
satisfying the categorial version of the Axiom of Choice.
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category SetU ), and this (along with any functor categories) is a perfectly legitimate
object formed in the stages of the cumulative hierarchy above U .
Grothendieck himself (in proposing a set-theoretic interpretation of category the-
ory) suggested the axiom that there should be an unbounded sequence of these uni-
verses. In fact, being a universe is clearly equivalent to being Vκ where κ is an in-
accessible cardinal, and so the proposal comes down to interpreting category theory
within any one of an unbounded sequence of inaccessible universes.
The standard objection to this strategy is that it apparently ‘prevents’ considering
perfectly acceptable categories, such as the actual category of all sets. Given any such
interpretation of category theory, there are sets outside of that interpretation. But
(so the objection goes) category theory is about any and all sets instantiating the
relevant category-theoretic interpretation. Any such restriction seems ad hoc. Muller
expresses the point as follows:
“Any stipulation to the effect that the category-theoretician is only al-
lowed to grab at some fixed set whereas outside this set there are more
sets, so that he is not permitted to grab at all of them, is artificial and
barks at his explicit intentions. The category- theoretician has every right
to refuse to dance to the cardinality tunes [of] the set-theoretician whis-
tles. Category-theory is about form & structure, irrespective of how much
& how many; it ‘only’ wants to have everything which is available. The
category-theoretician means all sets when he makes the category Set of
all sets, period. Set-theories which cannot accommodate this are flawed.”
([Muller, 2001], p. 11–12)
A different strategy then is to allow proper-class-sized categories (so-called ‘large’
categories), and adopt a two-sorted class-theoretic language and theory (such as
NBG orMK) in providing a category-theoretic interpretation. The problem here is
that often category-theorists will consider functor categories between two categories.
Taking two categories C and D, it is natural to consider the category DC consisting
of all functors from C to D as objects, and natural transformations between functors
as arrows. Such a category, however, is often one type higher than both C and D.
In the case then when both C and D are large, even with proper classes we are not
guaranteed the existence of a class-theoretic representative concerning CD (normally
proper classes cannot be members).19 The issues concerning both interpretations are
summed up as follows:
“Using universes, all the functor categories are there, but there is no cat-
egory of all groups. Using Godel-Bernays, one has the category of all
(small) groups, but only a few functor categories.”20 ([Mac Lane, 1971],
p. 235)
What should we take from this? Again we hold that these objections fail to gain
traction:
Response 1. A simple point, but one based on a non-trivial theorem, is that for
certain categories (in particular the category of all reflexive graphs), it is not clear
19Of course, the material set-theorist might just accept the existence of proper-classes, hyper-classes,
hyper-hyper-classes and so on. This is naturally interpretable in an ontology on which every universe
can be extended in height, but there is also a question of whether the believer in one maximal unique
universe of sets could also make use of nth-order hyper-classes. Normally it is assumed not, but this
question remains philosophically open.
20Given the topic of the present volume, there is an interesting question as to the extent to which this
difficulty is avoided in homotopy type theory. We thank Dimitris Tsementzis for the suggestion that this
difficulty could possibly be overcome in this foundation.
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that the requirements Mac Lane wishes to place on interpretations of category the-
ory are consistent. Specifically [Ernst, 2015] shows that there are restrictions on what
categories one can have. The proof proceeds by considering a version of Cantor’s
Theorem in the category of all reflexive graphs and shows that certain desirable
conditions on the existence of categories are jointly inconsistent.21 Thus we can-
not simply naively insist on the existence of any category whatsoever without some
restrictions.
Response 2. The problem implicitly takes a stand on issues in the philosophy of
set theory, though in the opposite direction to the previous section. For, in the case
where we think there is no maximal conception of the notion of ordinal, and rather
that any universe of set theory can be extended in height, we are always implicitly
restricted to a particular bounded universe of sets anyway. Thus, to the theorist who
holds that there are no ‘maximally high’ universes, the objection fails to gain any
traction.
Response 3. Even if we do allow that there can be ‘maximally high’ universes of
set theory, the objection again fails to account for the schematic nature of category
theory. Given this algebraic character, when a category theorist asks us to consider
“The category Set which has as objects all sets and arrows all functions” this should
be understood as shorthand for communicating various category-theoretic proper-
ties. Some of these are captured by first-order axiomatisations such as ETCS and its
extensions, but again, they are about a schematic type (in particular a first-order one)
rather than a particular concrete subject matter. So for studying this schematic type,
it is enough that we have just one structure exemplifying the schematic type. Results
proved about this schematic type can then be exported to other contexts (and other
structures instantiating the category-theoretic properties), the results are about the
schematic type and not the concrete instantiation of it in the sets.
Consider the case where we have both the Grothendieck-universe and class-
theoretic interpretations available to the set theorist. More precisely, suppose she
believes the following: (1.) There is a single unique universe of sets, (2.) There
are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals, and (3.) There is a satisfactory inter-
pretation of Morse-Kelley class theory over V . Now, consider the category theorist’s
consideration of Set, and how this relates to the set theorist’s universe. The category-
theoretic structure of Set is multiply instantiated, both by each individual Vκ where
κ is inaccessible, and also V (as well as many other structures besides, some of them
countable22). Now suppose we consider some ‘super-large’ functor category SetC
(for some category C). The SetC schematic type will be instantiated by the various
Vκ with the sets above them, but not by V (since there are no levels above V ). But
this does not matter, any properties proved about the schematic type Set using the
schematic type SetC can just be exported back to V , the proof concerning Set just
depends on there being some set-theoretic counterpart in which SetC is instantiated,
not that every instantiation of Set has a corresponding SetC representative. While it
is the case that when a category theorist states a theorem of the form “Set has an
extension to SetC” can only be interpreted to concern the small instantiations, this
does not harm the results about the schematic type Set, and the fact that any results
proved on the basis of SetC about that structure can perfectly well be exported back
to V . This is much like the case with first-order ZFC, it would be bizarre to claim
that results proved about ZFC using extensions in the model theory of sets are in-
21See [Ernst, 2017], [Maddy, 2017] and [Maddy, F] for further discussion of the significance of this result.
22An example of such a structure would be the Skolemisation and Mostowski Collapse of any set-
theoretic structure satisfying an appropriate amount of set theory.
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applicable to V because V lacks extensions.23
A natural rejoinder is that occasionally category theorists will consider explicitly
large categories like SET (i.e. the category of all sets) rather than just Set (interpreted
as the category of small sets in the first universe). Nonetheless, exactly the same
considerations apply concerning schematic types. Even if one insists that there is
a distinction between ‘small’ and ‘large’ sets, one can still have SET instantiated in
some small structure, it is just that that structure does not think it is small. These
considerations are familiar from the set-theoretic framework; one can easily have a
particular Vκ satisfying the claim that there are proper-class-many cardinals of some
kind Φ, without Vκ witnessing that there are literally (i.e. in V ) proper-class-many
such cardinals. One just requires that the Φ-cardinals are unbounded in Vκ for there
to be a universe satisfying this property. Indeed, as above, any conclusions based
on the theory ZFC+ “There is a proper class of Φ-cardinals”, made by considering
the extension of a model thereof can be exported back to V (on the assumption of
course that V does contain such a proper class). Similarly, one just needs a universe
containing an inaccessible (in fact if the schematic content of category theory is only
first-order, one needs much less) for there to be set-sized set-theoretic contexts in
which there is a meaningful distinction between small and large categories capable of
instantiating the relevant algebraic content. To argue that set theory fails to provide
an appropriate surrogate for SETC is to impute non-algebraic content to category
theory which is quite simply not there.
2.2.2 Inappropriateness
The inappropriateness dimension of Feferman’s taxonomy concerns set theory giv-
ing us too much of something (either objects or information). We’ll see that while
these problems are also resolvable, an additional line of inquiry is suggested by the
complaint that set theory provides too much non-isomorphism-invariant informa-
tion; namely to modify set theory so that the language respects isomorphism invari-
ance.
Logical strength. The first issue concerns the logical strength of set theory. For
the practical purposes of founding mathematics, so the argument goes, we do not
need anything like the strength of ZFC set theory. Landry and Marquis record this
sentiment:
“Second, it is fair to say that category theorists and categorical logicians
believe that mathematics does not require a unique, absolute, or defini-
tive foundation and that, for most purposes, frameworks logically weaker
than ZF are satisfactory. Categorical logic, for instance, is taken to pro-
vide the tools required to perform an analysis of the shared logical struc-
ture, in a categorical sense of that expression, involved in any mathemat-
ical discipline.” ([Landry and Marquis, 2005], p. 19)
We do not wish to disagree that large portions of mathematics do not require the
logical strength of ZFC set theory. However, we do wish to make two rejoinders:
Response 1. First, set theory does not aim at being ‘minimal’ in any sense. Rather,
we wish to provide the most generous theory possible (often understood through
23There may, nonetheless, be certain philosophical considerations here, as well as technical issues
concerning how much higher-order reasoning we can capture using extensions. See [Barton, S] and
[Antos et al., S] for discussion.
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maximising consistency strength) to be used in interpreting any conceivable mathe-
matics we might consider. So, while the objection might be convincing to a theorist
who has a penchant for minimising logical strength, it fails to be convincing to the
friend of set-theoretic foundations.
Response 2. Second, we have another tu quoque here: There are interesting
category-theoretic principles that turn our to have significant large cardinal strength.
Bagaria and Brooke-Taylor, for example, note the following (in an article on colimits
and elementary embeddings):
“Many problems in category theory, homological algebra, and homotopy
theory have been shown to be set-theoretical, involving the existence
of large cardinals. For example, the problem of the existence of rigid
classes in categories such as graphs, or metric spaces or compact Haus-
dorff spaces with continuous maps, which was studied by the Prague
school in the 1960’s turned out to be equivalent to the large cardinal prin-
ciple now known as Vope˘nka’s Principle... Another early example is John
Isbell’s 1960 result that SetOp is bounded if and only if there is no proper
class of measurable cardinals.” ([Bagaria and Brooke-Taylor, 2013], p. 1)
A key point to attend to in the above is that these are not category-theoretic prin-
ciples that were dreamt up by set theorists. These are principles that were naturally
studied by category theorists that turned out to not just be independent from ZFC,
but also have substantial large cardinal strength (Vope˘nka’s Principle is quite high in
the large cardinal hierarchy). Moreover, with certain additional assumptions one can
find models of material set theories like ZFC in categorial set theories like ETCS.24
In virtue of this, the claim that set theory is somehow unfavourably distinguished
by its logical strength when compared to category theory (in all its guises) seems
dubious.
Isomorphism invariance. The second problem of inappropriateness concerns the
earlier discussed fact that set theory makes decisions about non-isomorphism invari-
ant facts. The key issue is that a central practice in set-theoretic foundations involves
specific choices of ‘canonical’ representatives.
For example, in the earlier discussion of products, the exact object that is even-
tually selected as ‘the’ product will vary depending on numerous conventional stip-
ulations. We might, for example, represent the ordered pair 〈a, b〉 along the lines of
Hausdorff as {{a, 1}, {b, 2}} (rather than the usual Kuratowski definition:
〈a, b〉 =df {{a}, {a, b}}) resulting in a different choice of product. This then raises
the following question: If set theory is meant to tell us what mathematical objects
exist, then what is the fact the matter about which definition of product is the actual
product?
The problem was noticed in the philosophical literature at least as early as the
seminal [Benacerraf, 1965]. There, he presses this problem of non-isomorphism in-
variant choices to be made via the existence of ‘junk’ theorems, where a theorem is
‘junk’ when it concerns non-isomorphism invariant properties. For example, is it
true that 5 ∈ 7? A natural answer is “Yes”; the canonical choice of ordinals is the
von Neumann definition, and under that definition it is the case that 5 ∈ 7. How-
ever, under the Zermelo definition, it is not the case that 5 ∈ 7. So, if we think that
24For instance one way to do this is to find arrow-theoretic trees in a model of strengthened ETCS
that correspond to the relevant membership trees required to build a model of ZFC. We are grateful to
Michael Shulman for discussion here, and directing us to his useful [Shulman, 2010] and [Osius, 1974].
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mathematical objects ‘are’ sets (or, as Benacerraf points out, any objects) what is the
fact of the matter concerning whether or not 5 ∈ 7? Since the truths of number the-
ory are invariant under domain (we just need some things that have the standard
natural number structure under the relevant relations of the required vocabulary for
arithmetic to be true in that context) there seems to be no good response; whatever
objects we pick as ‘the’ natural numbers, they satisfy the same arithmetic sentences.
The simple response is that the many (if not most) set theorists do not subscribe to
the heavy-duty set-theoretic reductionism required to generate the problem. Rather,
most friends of set-theoretic foundations (or, at least, this is the line we shall present
here), take set theory to be a device of representation. Using the membership relation
and axioms of first-order logic we are able to interpret mathematical claims as ones
about sets, with axioms telling us how these objects can be combined to yield other
mathematical properties, providing a context in which different mathematical claims
can be interrelated.
Claims like “5 ∈ 7” just do not make sense for the friend of set-theoretic founda-
tions until we have settled on a particular interpretation of number theory. If we pick
the von Neumann ordinals, then the question of whether 5 ∈ 7 corresponds via our
chosen interpretation to whether 5 < 7 in number-theoretic terms, and so is obvi-
ously true (in fact trivially so). If we had picked a different representation, however,
it may have been false (as is the case on the Zermelian conception of finite ordinals).
This has implications for the purposes to which set theory is put in foundations.
The language is excellent for studying what kinds of mathematical properties are
compossible, and what kinds of objects are required to find an interpretation of a
piece of mathematics. Hence, the default context for studying independence re-
sults (and their implications) is models of set theory,25 and the indexing of consis-
tency strength is accomplished using set-theoretic principles. If one wishes to know
whether it is possible to have one mathematical property with or without another,
one studies the models of set theory in which they have interpretations. If one wishes
to know how much logical strength is implied by the adoption of a particular math-
ematical system, a standard technique is to find a model of the principle in the sets.
However, once a model has been found, few set theorists (if any) would suggest that
the mathematician should change their practice and adopt the (highly baroque) set-
theoretic language. The interpretation has been given, and this acts as a certificate
that the original (and probably more fluid) language is in good working order.26
This has implications for the kind of applications that we see for set theory to
mathematical structure. Rather than seeing it as a language and framework for the
working mathematician, it should rather be used in finding interpretations of the
working language and comparing them. Structurally, this might have important
consequences. One might, for example, see cardinality as an important structural
property. Set theory then provides us with a useful framework in which schematic
types of certain kinds and cardinality interact, to yield helpful structural informa-
25This said, there are category-theoretic options here. See [Bell, 2011].
26Vladimir Voevodky himself was clear about this role forZFCwith respect to Homotopy Type Theory.
See, for example, his abstract for the 2013 North American Meeting of the Association of Symbolic Logic,
where he says:
“Univalent foundations provide a new approach to the formal reasoning about mathemati-
cal objects. The languages which arise in this approach are much more convenient for doing
serious mathematics than ZFC at the cost of being much more complex. In particular, the
consistency issues for these languages are not intuitively clear. Thus ZFC retains its key
role as the theory which is used to ensure that the more and more complex languages of the
univalent approach are consistent.” ([ASL, 2014], p. 108)
We are grateful to Penelope Maddy for bringing this to our attention.
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tion. A good example here is the celebrated:
Theorem 7. The Morley Categoricity Theorem. Suppose that a countable first-order
theoryT has exactly one model up to isomorphism in a single uncountable cardinal.
Then it has one model (up to isomorphism) in every uncountable cardinal.
The standard proof of this proceeds against a background of material set theory.
Assuming that one does hold that cardinality is a structural property, it yields infor-
mation about how first-order schematic types and cardinality interact, specifically if
one has a first-order schematic type T (this could even be given categorially) it pro-
vides conditions that tell us when there is only one way (up to isomorphism) that T
could be instantiated in a structure of a particular size.
We thus make the preliminary conclusion; though material set theory is baroque
and choices must be made about canonical representatives in a fashion that is not
isomorphism invariant from the perspective of certain vocabularies (e.g. number
theory), it nonetheless provides a useful perspective for stating how schematic types
interact with other structural properties (namely cardinality). We thus subscribe to
a methodological pluralism in foundations; category theory is the appropriate the-
ory for explaining how schematic types interact with one another, but set theory is
the appropriate language for explaining how schematic types interact with concrete
systems of objects.27
This response is satisfactory as far as it goes. However, a challenge remains for
the set theorist: Could we possibly factor out the use of canonical representatives to
yield a conception of set on which we are able to use the combinatorial power of set
theory whilst considering isomorphism invariant properties?
The point is brought into especially clear focus when contrasting material set
theory with categorial theories of sets (like ETCS). We should note that meaningful
statements of categorial set theories like ETCS are not fully isomorphism invari-
ant. Take, for example, the claim “f has co-domain B” for some f and B. This
interpretable as a perfectly good formula in the language of category theory, but is
obviously not isomorphism invariant; there might be objects isomorphic to B which
differ as to whether they are the co-domain of f or not.28 However, something that
ETCS does offer is a way of ‘modding out’ this non-isomorphism invariant noise.
For instance, one can prove:
Theorem 8. (ETCS) Let φ(X) be a formula in the language of ETCS with no con-
stants and no free variables except the set variable X . Then if X and Y are isomor-
phic, then φ(X) iff φ(Y ).29
Thus ETCS provides us with a clean-cut class of formulas for which we have
isomorphism invariance. Our task for the rest of this paper is to make a preliminary
step in providing a material set theory that does the same for structure. We will
27The following analogy may be helpful. Viewing mathematics as describing a kind of quasi-
computational enterprise, set theory is something like a theory of machine-code: It tells us what kinds
of things can be built, and what we need to build them. Category theory on the other hand is like a high-
level programming language, codifying what effects can be achieved by different structural relationships
in different contexts. Both the set theorist as computational engineer and the category theorist as pro-
grammer have important roles to play in mathematics. This analogy was originally communicated to the
first-author by David Corfield after a talk at the LSE in November 2013. He is also grateful to Dr. Corfield
for subsequent discussion of categorial foundations.
28There are some theories that aim to make it impossible to state non-isomorphism-invariant proper-
ties in their language. Two candidates here are Makkai’s FOLDS (see [Makkai, 1998], [Marquis, 2017])
and Univalent Foundations (see [The Univalent Foundations Program, 2013], [Tsementzis, 2016]). We are
grateful to Dr. Tsementzis for pressing us on this point.
29See here [McLarty, 1993], p. 495.
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do so by proposing a theory of sets and classes built over structures composed of
urelements, and end up with a theory that better respects isomorphsim invariance
whilst facilitating the consideration of how schematic types and systems of concrete
objects interact (as in the Morley Categoricity Theorem).
3 How set theory helps the structural perspective
We now have a challenge for the friend of set-theoretic foundations; find a use of set-
theoretic language that better respects isomorphism invariance. In this section, we
do just that. The broad idea is to think of material set theory as built over some math-
ematical subject matter, conceived of as composed of structures with urelements and
the functions and relations between them. Our point is the following; we can fac-
tor out the arbitrary choices of coding to find a material set theory that by design
respects isomorphism invariance.
3.1 Set Theory with Structures (ZFCS)
In taking inspiration from structuralism30, we will consider structures as composed
of featureless points, and the functions and relations between them. Treating a fea-
tureless point as a kind of urelement, we will build a theory of sets and classes over
these urelements, and show how by doing so we can develop a more structurally
respectful theory in the language of sets and classes. However, this will also be a
framework in which it is possible to use the rich combinatorial power afforded by
material set theory in discussing notions of cardinality and structure.
Definition 9. The theory of Set Theory with Structures (or ZFCS) is defined as fol-
lows:
(i) Symbols:
(a) We have three sorts of variables: u0, u1, ..., un, ... will range over urelements
(to be featureless points in the domains of structures), s0, s1, ..., sn, ... will
range over structures, and x0, x1, ..., xn, ... will range over sets.
(b) The usual logical symbols (so one’s favourite connectives and quantfier(s)),
and one non-logical symbol ‘∈’ (to denote material set membership).
(c) Symbols: A single symbol U (for the universe), fm,n (for m-ary functions),
Rm,n (for m-ary relations) and cn (for constants), where m,n are natural
numbers and m > 0. These will be used to describe structures.
(ii) Atomic formulas:
(a) a = b where a, b are variables of the same sort.
(b) a ∈ b where a is a variable and b is a set-variable.
(c) U(s, a) where s is a structure-variable and a is an urelement-variable. (In-
tended meaning: a belongs to the universe (or domain) of the structure s.)
(d) fm,n(s, u1, ..., um) = u where s is a structure-variable, the ui and u are ure-
lement variables. (Intended meaning: the ui and u belong to the universe of
the structure s and the interpretation of the m-ary function symbol fm,n in
s sends (u1, ..., um) to u.)
30See here, for example, [Shapiro, 1991].
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(e) Rm,n(s, u1, ..., um) where s is a structure-variable and the ui are urelement
variables. (Intended meaning: The m-tuple (u1, ..., um) belongs to the inter-
pretation of the m-ary predicate symbol by the structure s.)
(f) cn(s) = u where s is a structure-variable and u is an urelement variable.
(Intended meaning: The interpretation of the constant symbol cn by s is u.)
(iii) Compound formulas: Obtained from atomic formulas by closing under connec-
tives and quantifiers in the usual way. (Though, since the language is 3-sorted,
there will be three kinds of quantifier; one for urelements, one for structures,
and one for sets.)
(iv) Axioms:
(a) Extensionality for sets.
(b) Formula-Foundation for Sets: If a formula holds of some set then it holds of
some set which is disjoint from all other sets for which the formula holds.
(c) The Axiom of Infinity: Usually rendered as concerning the existence of an
inductive pure set.
(d) Pairing, Union, Powerset, Separation and Collection for sets.
(e) Axiom of Choice for sets.
(f) The domain of every structure is a set: i.e. ∀s∃x∀a(U(s, a)↔ a ∈ x).
(g) The Anti-Urelement Set Axiom: No set contains all of the urelements.
Some remarks concerning the definition are in order:
Remark 10. First, whilst the Anti-Urelement Set Axiom merits philosophical dis-
cussion31, consideration in detail would take us too far afield here. We make this
assumption simply to avoid bounding the sizes of the structures we have available,
and settle for the pragmatic justification that we are trying to show that material set
theory can convey important structural information, not that it must in every situa-
tion.32
Remark 11. Second, we are taking inspiration from the structuralist literature in the
following sense: Structures are to be understood as composed of featureless points
(given by the urelemente) and the ways they may correspond (with functions and
relations). Effectively, we layer sets on top of antecedently given structures conceived
of in this sense. As we’ll see, this facilitates cardinality comparisons whilst allowing
for a theory that respects isomorphism invariance.
3.2 Class Theory with Structures (NBGS)
We are now in a position where we have a theory of structures and the sets that
can be built over them. In order to arrive at a language that respects isomorphism
invariance we now augment with class variables. As we shall see, this allows us to
latch onto a range of isomorphism invariant classes.
Definition 12. Our Class Theory with Structures (orNBGS) comprises the following:
1. Symbols: All the symbols ofZFCS, with an additional kind of variablesX0, X1, ..., Xn, ...
for classes.
31For two examples of such discussion, see [McGee, 1997] and [Rumfitt, 2015].
32An alternative would be to take the ‘wide sets’ approach of [Menzel, 2014] and modify Replacement.
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2. Atomic formulas: In addition to the well-formed formulas of ZFCS, we admit
Xn = Xm for class variables Xn and Xm as well-formed, as well as v0 ∈ Xn for
class-variable Xn and v0 is either a set, structure, or urelement variable.
3. Compound formulas: Obtained inductively from the connectives, ∈, urele-
mente quantifiers, structure quantifiers, set quantifiers, and class quantifiers.
4. Axioms:
(a) All axioms of ZFCS.
(b) Extensionality for classes (i.e. Xn and Xm are equal iff they have the same
members).
(c) Predicative Class Comprehension:
∃X∀u∀s∀x[(φ(u)↔ u ∈ X) ∧ (ψ(s)↔ s ∈ X) ∧ (χ(x)↔ x ∈ X)]
(Where u is a urelement variable, s is a structure variable, and x is a set
variable, there are no class quantifiers33 in φ, ψ, and χ, and each of φ, ψ,
and χ is free for u, s, and x respectively.)
Effectively we allow extensional classes composed of objects of mixed types. The
intuition behind the theory is this; once we have built our sets and structures out
of sets and urelements, we can then talk definably about them (much in the same
way as it is legitimate to talk about definable classes in the ZFC context). As we’ll
shortly see, we can then restrict to certain classes in using our set and class-theoretic
language to latch onto isomorphism invariant properties.
One technical issue is how to treat isomorphism within this framework. We really
have two notions available:
Definition 13. Two structures s0 and s1 are structure-theoretically isomorphic iff there
is a third structure s within which there is a binary relation between the universes of
s0 and s1 satisfying the usual rules of isomorphism.
Definition 14. Two structures s0 and s1 are set-theoretically isomorphic iff there is a
set-theoretic bijection between the domains if s0 and s1 satisfying the usual rules of
isomorphism.
Remark 15. Effectively the set-theoretic notion of isomorphism is the usual one,
whilst the structure-theoretic notion pulls talk of structures and isomorphism into
the prior given theory of structure.
What this prior given theory of structure satisfies will be important for our re-
sults and arguments, since we require the closure of our NBGS world under iso-
morphism. What we show below will always hold for the set-theoretic notion of
isomorphism, but there is a chance that if the antecedent theory of structures over
which we layerNBGS is too impoverished, then set-theoretic isomorphisms might
not be mirrored by structure-theoretic ones. For example, consider a world which
hasNBGS layered over a theory of structure on which there is only one structure s0
composed of an isolated point u0 with no relations on it. This is be perfectly legiti-
mate as aNBGS structure. However, while there are set-theoretic isomorphisms in
33We make this assumption merely for technical hygiene sinceNBGS will do the job we want neatly.
One could also drop this restriction, and use an impredicative comprehension scheme yielding a struc-
tural form of Morse-Kelley (call it MKS). This may well have interesting additional properties, such as
the ability to define a satisfaction predicate for the universe and first-order formulas.
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this world (specifically f defined by the rule f(u0) = u0), the underlying theory of
structure lacks the resources to even see that s0 is isomorphic to itself.
One fix would be to introduce the following axiom:
Axiom 16. The Structural Richness Axiom: Any set-theoretic isomorphism has a
corresponding extensionally equivalent structure-theoretic isomorphism.34
This would guarantee the existence of the isomorphisms we need for our results
both set-theoretically and structure-theoretically. Indeed, we might derive the Struc-
tural Richness Axiom from the idea that any set-theoretic structure should be mir-
rored by a structure-theoretic one, postulating the following:
Axiom 17. The Structural Radical Richness Axiom: Any set-theoretic structure is
mirrored by a corresponding structure-theoretic structure.35
The extent to which our theory of structure should mirror what we have going
on in the sets is an interesting one, but we shall set it aside from our technical re-
sult. Since we wish to leave it entirely open what the underlying theory of structure
should satisfy (maybe, for example, we just want to buildNBGS over the structural
groups and nothing else?) we shall simply concern ourselves for the technical work
with the set-theoretic notion of isomorphism. Later, we will reconsider structural
richness axioms in discussion how set theory has interesting things to say about the
interaction of schematic types with structures.
We now have the resources to factor out non-isomorphism invariant properties
from our theory whilst having combinatorial sets around to facilitate proof. This is
shown by the following analogue of the earlier mentioned ETCS theorem concern-
ing isomorphism invariance:
Theorem 18. (NBGS) Suppose that φ(v) is a formula without parameters in the
language of NBGS and v is a variable ranging over structures. Suppose that M is
a model for NBGS and s0 and s1 are structures in M which are isomorphic in M.
Then M |= φ(s0)↔ φ(s1).
Proof. The idea of the proof is simply to take an isomorphism pi between s0 and s1
and then use it to build an automorphism pi′ from M to M, moving M’s satisfaction
of φ(s0) to φ(s1) (dual reasoning obtains the converse implication). So, let pi be the
witnessing structure-theoretic isomorphism. We define pi′ as follows:
(i) pi′(u) = pi(u) if u is an urelement in dom(pi).
(ii) pi′(s) is obtained from s by replacing each urelement u in the universe of s by
pi(u).
(iii) We can then (by induction and the well-foundedness of membership) replace a
set x by defining pi′(x) as {pi′(y)|y ∈ x}.
(iv) We similarly replace a class X by pi′(X) =df {pi′(y)|y ∈ X}.
(v) This pi′ yields an automorphism of M sending s0 to s1. Thus M satisfies “φ(s0)
iff φ(s1)”.36
34In fuller formalism: If f is a set-theoretic isomorphism between s0 and s1, then there is an s such that
s maps uα to u′α iff f does.
35In fuller formalism: For any set X of urelements and set-theoretic functions fXm,n, relations RXm,n on
X , and constants cXn in X , there is an s such that U(s, uα) (for each uα ∈ X), and structural relations
fsm,n, Rsm,n, and csn equivalent to fXm,n, RXm,n, and cXn in the obvious way.
36This can be proved by the usual tedious induction on the complexity of φ.
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Remark 19. A very similar theorem holds for formulas with more free variables, pro-
viding that the domains of the structures are non-overlapping. In this way, NBGS
can provide a kind of isomorphism invariance stronger than the one for ETCS as
given in Theorem 8.
Thus, while there are many non-isomorphism invariant facts we can state within
NBGS (e.g. for an urelement or structure v, “v ∈ X”), we can factor out this non-
isomorphism invariant ‘noise’ in a precise way. Thus, for φ of the appropriate form,
if we use the ambient material set-theoretic properties to prove φ about s, we can
transfer φ to any structure isomorphic to s.
If we then allow ourselves some axiom of structural richness (e.g. either Axiom
16 or Axiom 17) we can talk about inter-structural relationships such as embeddabil-
ity and cardinality of structures using set-theoretic resources, whilst factoring out
the structural content. For example, concerning cardinality, every cardinal number
exists, both with respect to the relevant set-theoretic code living in the universe of
NBGS under consideration, but also there is (given an assumption of structural rich-
ness) a structure of pure cardinality (i.e. of featureless points with no relationships
between them). In this way the theory provides a way of combinatorially linking
bona fide structures with their set-theoretic codes.
This has ramifications for how we treat theorems best suited for material set the-
ory. The Morley Categoricity Theorem, for example, can be recast as the claim that
for any countable T inLω,ω (i.e. T is a particular kind of first-order schematic type)
if T is satisfied by exactly one structure (up to isomorphism) for structures with do-
main of some particular uncountable size, then given any two structures satisfying
T, if their domains are uncountable and the same size, then they are isomorphic.
This version of the Morley Categoricity Theorem facilitates extraction of struc-
tural information: All the above can be recast as talk directly about theories and
structures. However, the ambient material set theory provided byNBGS has a role
to play: The proof could be formalised exactly as is usually done in the material set-
theoretic case, since we have the relevant set-theoretic resources, set-theoretic codes,
and model theory lying around.37 It is just that in the end we can easily extract the
purely structural content from Morley’s result using Theorem 18 and assumptions of
structural richness, and then talk directly and transparently about structures con-
ceived of in a sense independent of set-theoretic coding.
Moreover, not only do we now have a way to extract the purely structural infor-
mation from the material set theory, but we can also find non-arbitrary representa-
tives for structures:
Definition 20. In NBGS, we say that a class X consisting of structures is (set- or
structure-theoretically) invariant if X is closed under isomorphism between struc-
tures. If in addition any two structures in X are isomorphic we refer to X as a (set-
or structure-theoretic) isomorphism type.
Thus, in NBGS we can equate specific mathematical structures with isomor-
phism types. This then gives us a non-arbitrary, non-coding dependent represen-
tative for the structure in question (since isomorphism types include all and only
the structures isomorphic to one another). However, all this occurs in a framework
where we have the full resources of material set theory available to speak about their
relationships.
37See, for example, [Tent and Ziegler, 2012] for a presentation of the usual proof.
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4 Conclusions and open questions
How does this perspective provide philosophical progress? Our main claim (as spec-
ified in the introduction) was to show that material set theory seems to be interesting
from the structural perspective. In particular, it still represents our best theory of car-
dinality, and how cardinality interacts with properties of syntactic theories. In this
respect it is of interest to friends of both set-theoretic and category-theoretic founda-
tions.
Of course one might simply reject that cardinality is a structural property, and
that cardinality considerations fade away when one takes seriously a structural per-
spective as coded categorially.38 This raises an important first question for future
research:
Question 21. To what extent should cardinality be viewed as a structural property?
If we accept that cardinality is structural, however, it is interesting that we can,
by taking much structural talk at face value, come up with a theory (namelyNBGS)
that allows us to easily extract structural content from set-theoretic claims. In this
way, we have both the combinatorial power of set theory but also a way of factoring
out non-isomorphism invariant content.
The theory represents a small first step on a wider research programme in the
foundations of mathematics: How can we fuse different perspectives to yield new
mathematical and philosophical perspectives and results? In particular, we have left
open the following questions:
Question 22. There is the possibility of looking at categorial structure of theories
likeNBGS. Some, are easy: The category of isomorphism invariant classes that has
as objects isomorphism types and equivalence classes of embeddings as arrows is
an obvious choice. However, there is also the possibility of looking at the categorial
structure of the classes of mixed type. What sorts of categorial relationships does
this world support?
One remaining challenge is the following: In the introduction it was noted that
certain categories have non-function-like relationships either for trivial reasons (such
as the category of proofs of a logical system) or deeper ones concerning the nature of
the category itself, such as with non-concrete categories like the homotopy category.
The framework we have provided depends explicitly on a notion of structure on
which isomorphism is understood as a functorial relationship between structures. A
question then is:
Question 23. Can a similar perspective be found that brings set-theoretic combina-
torial power to bear on non-concrete categories?
This would further help to inform the following project:
Question 24. Aside from the normal interpretations of category theory in set theory
(either through universes or classes) or set theory in category theory (say via the
use of objects and arrows coding membership-trees), what further ways are there of
combining the different perspectives? We have shown how this can be done with
respect to ‘structure’ and ‘cardinality’, but can we have further philosophically and
mathematically fruitful fusions of these two perspectives?
For the moment, we hope to have shown that there is at least the possibility of
combining different perspectives to yield interesting fusions of foundational theo-
ries.
38We are grateful to Steve Vickers for pressing this point.
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